ABSTRACT

The core insight of the new EU framework for bank resolution is to allocate losses to bank's insiders (bail-inable creditors). This affects both financial stability and the corporate governance of banks. The current academic debate on bank resolution overlooks the relevance of identifying the investors in bail-inable securities (ie who is going to bear losses) and the role of counterparty risk. This article identifies the investors that are better suited to hold those instruments and highlights the trade-offs between the corporate governance role and the threat to financial stability posed by different investors. The article demonstrates that the composition of bail-inable debtholders matters and shows – empirically and theoretically – a transition towards a desirable composition of holders; although a considerable room for improvement remains. This exercise deepens the understanding of the impact of the resolution framework and the importance of counterparties for its credibility and future applications.

摘要

新的欧盟银行处置框架的核心观点是将损失分配给银行的内部人员（无法保释的债权人）。这会影响金融稳定性和银行的公司治理。当前关于银行决议的学术争论忽略了确定可保释证券投资者（即谁将承担损失）的相关性以及交易对手风险的作用。本文确定了更适合持有这些工具的投资者，并强调了公司治理角色与不同投资者对金融稳定构成的威胁之间的权衡。这篇文章表明，可保释的债务持有人的构成很重要，并从经验和理论上表明了向理想的持有人构成过渡；尽管仍有相当大的改进空间。