ABSTRACT

The core insight of the new EU framework for bank resolution is to allocate losses to bank's insiders (bail-inable creditors). This affects both financial stability and the corporate governance of banks. The current academic debate on bank resolution overlooks the relevance of identifying the investors in bail-inable securities (ie who is going to bear losses) and the role of counterparty risk. This article identifies the investors that are better suited to hold those instruments and highlights the trade-offs between the corporate governance role and the threat to financial stability posed by different investors. The article demonstrates that the composition of bail-inable debtholders matters and shows – empirically and theoretically – a transition towards a desirable composition of holders; although a considerable room for improvement remains. This exercise deepens the understanding of the impact of the resolution framework and the importance of counterparties for its credibility and future applications.

摘要

新的欧盟银行解决方案框架的核心见解是将损失分配给银行内部人员（无法保释的债权人）。这会影响金融稳定性和银行的公司治理。当前有关银行解决方案的学术辩论忽视了确定可保值证券（即将要承担损失的投资者）的投资者以及交易对手风险的作用的相关性。本文确定了最适合持有这些工具的投资者，并着重强调了公司治理角色与不同投资者对财务稳定性的威胁之间的权衡。这篇文章证明了无法保释的债务持有人的组成很重要，并且从经验和理论上表明了向理想的持有人组成的过渡。尽管仍有很大的改进空间。