This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse off when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which turns out to be the class of games where the procedural egalitarian solution selects from the core. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, these two axioms characterize the solution that assigns the core allocation which lexicographically minimizes the maximal payoffs. This solution even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).

本文确定了可转让效用游戏的最大领域，在该领域上总的单调性（当大联盟的价值增加时，没有玩家会变得更糟）和平均主义的核心选择（从富人到穷人的转移无法获得其他核心分配）玩家）是兼容的，事实证明这是程序均等解决方案从核心中选择的一类游戏。在这个包括大型核心游戏类的领域上，这两个公理表征了分配核心分配的解决方案，该解决方案从字典上最小化了最大收益。该解决方案甚至可以满足联盟的单调性（当一个联盟的价值增加时，没有成员会变得更糟）和强大的平等核心选择（通过从较富裕的参与者转移到较贫穷的参与者无法获得其他核心分配）。