Abstract

The US federal government outsources much of its work abroad, spurring a large and competitive industry to implement these contracts. Simultaneously, the US government has an explicit foreign policy goal of improving local economic development in many of the countries where contract implementation occurs. As such, agencies may prioritize awarding contracts to local organizations as a tool to both develop capacity and improve sustainability. This study explores the extent to which federal agencies select locally owned versus externally owned contractors, and the factors that predict whether a contract will be given to a locally owned firm. Findings show that that when uncertainty is high, US agencies are more likely to use externally owned service providers to reduce risk. Locally owned contractors tend to be selected in countries with higher levels of capacity, and when the contracting agency has development objectives. Taken together, findings indicate that contracting officials generally prioritize management considerations, although the US Department of State may use contracts as a form of foreign aid.

摘要

美国联邦政府将其大部分工作外包给国外，刺激了一个大型且具有竞争力的行业来执行这些合同。同时，美国政府有一个明确的外交政策目标，即在许多执行合同的国家促进当地经济发展。因此，机构可以优先将合同授予当地组织，作为发展能力和提高可持续性的工具。本研究探讨了联邦机构选择本地拥有的承包商与外部拥有的承包商的程度，以及预测合同是否会授予本地拥有的公司的因素。调查结果表明，当不确定性很高时，美国机构更有可能使用外部拥有的服务提供商来降低风险。当承包机构有发展目标时，往往会在能力水平较高的国家选择当地拥有的承包商。综上所述，调查结果表明，尽管美国国务院可能将合同用作对外援助的一种形式，但合同官员通常会优先考虑管理因素。