An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneur and the market. In this setting, zombie lending is inevitable: Once the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, the bank will roll over loans even after learning bad news, for the prospect of future market financing. Zombie lending is mitigated when the entrepreneur faces financial constraints. Finally, the bank stops producing information too early if information production is costly.

中文翻译：

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僵尸借贷理论

企业家从关系银行或市场借款。银行的资本成本较高，但随着时间的推移会产生私人信息。随着贷款关系的持续，企业家积累了声誉，但银行/企业家与市场之间也出现了信息不对称。在这种情况下，僵尸贷款是不可避免的：一旦企业家变得足够有信誉，银行即使在得知坏消息后也会展期贷款，为未来市场融资的前景。当企业家面临财务限制时，僵尸贷款就会减少。最后，如果信息生产成本高昂，银行会过早停止生产信息。