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International joint ventures, technology licensing and ownership structure
International Journal of Economic Theory ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-05 , DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12302
Hamid Beladi, May Hu, Tan (Charlene) Lee

To enter into a host country market with significant technological distance, a multinational corporation forms a joint venture affiliate with a local partner and collects licensing royalties from the affiliate. Both parties to the joint venture simultaneously decide their respective equity shares and the capital capacity of a continuous investment project via Nash bargaining. Since the multinational corporation receives licensing royalties from its local partner, it will therefore hold a share smaller than its relative bargaining power. In addition, the multinational firm will demand a larger ownership share if the royalty rate is lower, or the repurchase price of capital becomes lower. The joint venture firm will install a higher capital capacity when entering the host-country market if the price either to repurchase or to resell capital becomes higher. This capacity installation decision, however, will not be affected by the licensing royalty rate.

中文翻译:

国际合资企业、技术许可和所有权结构

为进入技术距离较远的东道国市场,跨国公司与当地合作伙伴组建合资子公司,并向该子公司收取许可使用费。合资双方通过纳什议价同时决定各自的股权比例和持续投资项目的资本能力。由于跨国公司从其当地合作伙伴那里获得许可使用费,因此它持有的份额将小于其相对议价能力。此外,如果特许权使用费率较低,或资本回购价格较低,跨国公司将要求更大的所有权份额。如果回购或转售资本的价格变高,合资公司将在进入东道国市场时安装更高的资本能力。但是,此容量安装决策不会受到许可使用费率的影响。
更新日期:2021-04-05
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