We present a novel rationale for bundling in vertical relations. In many markets, upstream firms compete to be in the best downstream slots (e.g., the best shelf in a retail store or the default application on a platform). If a multi-product upstream firm faces competition for a subset of its products, we show that tying the monopolised product with the competitive ones can reduce upstream rivals’ willingness to offer slotting fees to retailers. This strategy does not rely on entry deterrence and can be achieved through contractual or even virtual tying. The model is particularly relevant to the Google-Android case.

中文翻译：

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上游捆绑和市场力量的杠杆作用

我们提出了在垂直关系中捆绑的新原理。在许多市场中，上游公司竞争最好的下游位置（例如，零售店的最佳货架或平台上的默认应用程序）。如果一家多产品上游公司面临对其产品子集的竞争，我们表明将垄断产品与竞争产品捆绑在一起可以降低上游竞争对手向零售商提供进场费的意愿。这种策略不依赖进入威慑，可以通过合同甚至虚拟搭售来实现。该模型与 Google-Android 案例特别相关。