We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment, a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting, policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high, introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output—yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pigouvian tax raised output might wrongly conclude that this harmed welfare and that a larger tax increase would also raise output. This counter-intuitive impact on output is demonstrated theoretically for a general model and found in case studies for public goods subsidies and cartels.

中文翻译：

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具有粘性社会规范的干预：批评

我们研究了当社会规范是内生的但改变代价高昂时政策干预的后果。在我们的环境中，一个群体面临着负面的外部性，它通过惩罚形式的激励来部分缓解。在这种情况下，政策干预可能会产生意想不到的后果。最引人注目的是，当讨价还价的成本很高时，引入庇古税可以增加产出——但这样做会增加福利。一位观察家看到增加庇古税会提高产出，可能会错误地得出结论，认为这会损害福利，并且更大的税收增加也会提高产出。这种对产出的反直觉影响在理论上可以通过一般模型得到证明，并在公共产品补贴和卡特尔的案例研究中发现。