To qualify as a fully rational agent, one must be able rationally to revise one’s beliefs in the light of new evidence. This requires, not only that one revise one’s beliefs in the right way, but also that one do so as a result of appreciating the evidence on the basis of which one is changing one’s mind. However, the very nature of belief seems to pose an obstacle to the possibility of satisfying this requirement – for, insofar as one believes that p, any evidence that not-p will strike one as misleading and, on the face of it, believing that a certain piece of evidence is misleading is incompatible with appreciating the fact that such evidence should bear on the question at hand. Call this the ‘Paradox of Belief Revision’. This paper introduces the Paradox of Belief Revision, compares it with Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox, and suggests that we may be able to see a way out of the former if we assume that rational agents are systematically aware of their own beliefs as beliefs they have.

为了有资格成为完全理性的代理人，一个人必须能够根据新证据合理地修改自己的信念。这不仅要求人们以正确的方式修改自己的信念，而且要求人们这样做是由于欣赏证据的结果，即在此基础上人们改变了主意。然而，信仰的本质似乎构成障碍，以满足这一要求的可能性-对，只要一个人相信p，任何证据证明一事─ p会误以为是一种误导，并且从表面上看，认为某些证据具有误导性，与赞赏此类证据应放在眼前的问题这一事实是不相容的。将此称为“信仰修订悖论”。本文介绍了信仰修正的悖论，并将其与克里普克的教条主义悖论进行了比较，并建议如果我们假设理性主体系统地意识到他们自己的信念即他们所拥有的信念，那么我们也许可以找到一种摆脱前者的方法。