According to Goldman and Olsson's so-called conditional probability solution to the extra-value-of-knowledge problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because having the former makes the acquisition of further similar true beliefs in the future more likely than having the latter does. Unfortunately, however, several philosophers have rejected the comparative probability claim Goldman and Olsson's solution is based on. In this paper, I present a new argument in defence of this claim. More precisely, I point out a highly plausible necessary and sufficient condition for the latter and argue for its truth by bringing together confirmation-theoretic and reliabilist considerations. I also explain where a number of objections against Goldman and Olsson's probabilistic claim seem to go wrong.

中文翻译：

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高盛和奥尔森解决知识超值问题的新论证

根据 Goldman 和 Olsson 所谓的知识超值问题的条件概率解决方案，知识比单纯的真实信念更有价值，因为拥有前者使得未来更有可能获得更多相似的真实信念而不是拥有后者。然而，不幸的是，一些哲学家拒绝了 Goldman 和 Olsson 的解决方案所基于的比较概率论断。在这篇论文中，我提出了一个新的论点来为这一主张辩护。更准确地说，我为后者指出了一个非常合理的必要和充分条件，并通过将确认理论和可靠性考虑结合在一起来论证其真实性。我还解释了许多反对高盛和奥尔森概率论的反对意见似乎出错的地方。