A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs.

中文翻译：

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国王运动中的合同、薪酬和表现：来自赛马的证据

大量证据表明，与绩效相关的薪酬计划可以提高工人的生产力，其中大部分是由于工人分类而提高的。然而，很少观察到与绩效相关的薪酬合同的权力变化。纯种赛马业提供了这样一个机会。与早期的研究相反，我们没有发现任何证据表明当激励合同的权力因骑师从完全与绩效相关的薪酬计划转变为受薪（保留）合同而减少时，工人会偷懒。此外，薪金合同会产生遗留效应，即使在薪金协议到期后，精英骑师仍会继续表现出色。我们认为这是由于降低了监控成本。