ABSTRACT

In democratic politics, the participation of interest groups in policymaking is commonly understood as a secluded affair. Why would interest groups and policymakers make public an otherwise private affair? I argue that legislators invite interest groups to participate in the legislative process to raise the salience of issues they ”own”. Legislators with gatekeeping authority, I show, bring interest groups into committees when their party benefits from raising public attention. Interest groups, on their part, are given preferential access to finetune laws that directly affect them. Extensions of the model show that participation increases before an election and declines after, with issue salience providing electoral benefits rather than policy ones. I test my argument using an original dataset of 4902 instances of interest group participation in committee meetings in the Ecuadorian Congress between 1988 and 2018, as well as over 30 interviews to interest group representatives, legislators, and congressional staff.

摘要

在民主政治中，利益集团参与决策通常被理解为一件隐秘的事情。为什么利益集团和政策制定者会公开一件私事？我认为，立法者邀请利益集团参与立法过程，以提高他们“拥有”的问题的显着性。我表明，当他们的政党从提高公众关注度中获益时，拥有把关权的立法者会将利益集团带入委员会。就利益集团而言，他们可以优先使用直接影响他们的微调法律。该模型的扩展表明，参与在选举前增加并在选举后下降，问题突出提供选举利益而不是政策利益。