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By invitation only: on why do politicians bring interest groups into committees
The Journal of Legislative Studies Pub Date : 2021-04-05 , DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2021.1905327
Sebastián Vallejo Vera

ABSTRACT

In democratic politics, the participation of interest groups in policymaking is commonly understood as a secluded affair. Why would interest groups and policymakers make public an otherwise private affair? I argue that legislators invite interest groups to participate in the legislative process to raise the salience of issues they ”own”. Legislators with gatekeeping authority, I show, bring interest groups into committees when their party benefits from raising public attention. Interest groups, on their part, are given preferential access to finetune laws that directly affect them. Extensions of the model show that participation increases before an election and declines after, with issue salience providing electoral benefits rather than policy ones. I test my argument using an original dataset of 4902 instances of interest group participation in committee meetings in the Ecuadorian Congress between 1988 and 2018, as well as over 30 interviews to interest group representatives, legislators, and congressional staff.



中文翻译:

仅受邀请:关于政客为何将利益集团纳入委员会

摘要

在民主政治中,利益集团参与决策通常被认为是一件僻静的事情。利益集团和政策制定者为什么要公开本来是私人事务呢?我认为,立法者邀请利益集团参与立法程序,以提高他们“拥有”的问题的重要性。我展示了具有看门权限的立法者,只要他们的政党受益于公众关注,便将利益集团纳入委员会。利益集团可以优先获得直接影响他们的微调法律。该模型的扩展表明,选举前的参与增加,选举后则减少,问题的突出性提供的是选举收益,而不是政策收益。

更新日期:2021-04-05
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