Like scientists, investigators and decision-makers in criminal cases both explain known evidence and use the resulting explanations to make novel predictions. Philosophers of science have made much of this distinction, arguing that hypotheses which lead to successful predictions are—all else being equal—epistemically superior to those that merely explain known data. Their ideas also offer important lessons for criminal evidence scholarship. This article distinguishes three values of prediction over explaining known facts in criminal cases. First, witnesses who predict are—all else being equal—more reliable than those who do not because they are less likely to be biased or lying. Second, investigators who only explain known facts run the risk of ‘fudging’ the scenarios that they formulate. Predictions can protect us against this danger. Third, carefully constructed predictions may help investigators to avoid confirmation bias. This article ends with a case study of the murder of Hae Min Lee.

像科学家一样，刑事案件中的调查人员和决策者都可以解释已知证据，并使用由此产生的解释做出新颖的预测。科学哲学家对此做出了很大的区分，认为导致成功的预测的假设在其他方面都是相等的，从理论上讲，这些假设优于仅解释已知数据的假设。他们的想法也为刑事证据学术提供了重要的教训。本文在解释刑事案件中的已知事实时，区分了预测的三个价值。首先，预言的证人（在所有其他方面都是平等的）比不作证的人更可靠，因为他们不太可能有偏见或说谎。其次，仅解释已知事实的调查人员冒着“混淆”他们制定的方案的风险。预测可以保护我们免受这种危险。第三，精心构建的预测可能有助于调查人员避免确认偏倚。本文以对海敏李被谋杀的案例研究结尾。