Any policy requires a ‘frame’ and, by the same token, entails an ‘overflow’, externalizing a certain part of the world as irrelevant. This mundane business of policy framing and overflowing became an urgent matter of concern in Japan in March 2011, as the Fukushima nuclear disaster exposed how the existing frame of nuclear safety had permitted the fatal overflow of severe accident management. In fact, despite the creation of the new regulatory agency in September 2012, the post-Fukushima frame of nuclear safety continued to externalize off-site evacuation planning – a key component of severe accident management – until March 2015. To explain such persistence of the overflow, I borrow the concept of ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ from the policy-oriented strand of science and technology studies and infuse it with hermeneutical rigor of the strong program of cultural sociology. Specifically, I illustrate how the trajectory of Japan’s nuclear safety was decisively shaped by the pacifist imaginary and the safety myth, organized around the binary opposition ‘sacred = civilian use = safe vs. profane = military use = dangerous’, without reducing this deeper cultural logic of framing and overflowing to the political economy of nuclear energy or the global isomorphism of nuclear technology.

任何政策都需要一个“框架”，并且出于同样的原因，也需要一个“溢出”，将世界的某个部分外部化为不相关的。随着福岛核灾难暴露了现有的核安全框架如何造成严重事故管理的致命溢出，2011年3月，这种制定政策和溢出问题的平凡事务成为日本急需解决的问题。实际上，尽管在2012年9月成立了新的监管机构，但福岛核电站后的核安全框架仍继续将场外疏散计划（严重事故管理的关键组成部分）外部化，直到2015年3月。溢出，我借鉴了以政策为导向的科学技术研究的“社会技术想象”概念，并将其注入严格的文化社会学计划的解释学严谨中。具体而言，我说明了和平主义者的假想和安全神话如何在围绕二元反对派“神圣=平民使用=安全vs.亵渎=军事使用=危险”的情况下，决定性地塑造了日本核安全的轨迹，而没有减少这种深层次的文化构架和溢出到核能的政治经济学或核技术的全球同构的逻辑。