Political institutions may directly affect the likelihood of currency crises by influencing market confidence. They may indirectly affect the likelihood of currency crises by influencing economic fundamentals. This study uses econometric mediation to estimate both direct and indirect causal pathways for veto player theory—a common framework for analyzing political institutional constraints—and finds this approach improves upon the standard econometric approach in the extant literature, which only estimates the direct causal pathway. This new mediated approach shows that political constraints also indirectly reduce the likelihood of crises through strengthening key economic fundamentals. Additionally, the analysis finds that when global conditions are stable, more constraints are shown to directly reduce the risk of crises. When global conditions are volatile, more constraints are shown to directly increase the risk of crises. Global volatility is more likely to cause crises in countries with relatively constrained political systems, and vice versa.

政治机构可能会通过影响市场信心来直接影响货币危机的可能性。它们可能会通过影响经济基本面而间接影响货币危机的可能性。本研究采用计量调解估计都对否决球员理论，一个共同的框架，直接和间接的因果途径分析政治制度约束和认定这种方法改善了在现存文献中，这仅仅是估计值的标准计量方法直接因果途径。这种新的调解方法表明，政治限制也间接通过加强关键的经济基础来降低发生危机的可能性。此外，分析发现，当全球状况稳定时，显示出更多的限制条件可以直接减少危机的风险。当全球局势动荡时，更多的限制因素将直接增加发生危机的风险。全球动荡更可能在政治制度相对受限的国家引发危机，反之亦然。