Abstract—

A general equilibrium model, which describes the interaction of heterogeneous agents who choose between the labor market and self-employment and the state, which plays the role of an inspection body (auditor) in a model that controls the fact of tax evasion, is considered. It is shown that in the case of information asymmetry, the tax rate that maximizes the amount of tax revenues increases. Under information asymmetry, the Laffer curve approaches its analog with symmetric information if the penalties or the budgets of the tax office are high. Despite the fact that in equilibrium the amount of penalties paid is zero, they have a significant effect on the amount of tax revenues. As an effective deterrent to tax violators, they are increasing the amount of tax collections at a slower pace.

中文翻译：

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具有税收审计和劳动力市场与自雇之间的内生选择的一般均衡模型

摘要—

考虑了一个一般均衡模型，该模型描述了在劳动力市场和自营职业与国家之间进行选择的异类代理人的相互作用，该模型在控制逃税事实的模型中扮演了检查机构（审计员）的角色。 。结果表明，在信息不对称的情况下，使税收收入最大化的税率会增加。在信息不对称的情况下，如果税收机关的罚款或预算很高，则拉弗曲线会以对称信息接近其类似物。尽管在平衡状态下支付的罚款额为零，但它们对税收收入有重大影响。为了有效地遏制违反税收的行为，他们正在以较慢的速度增加税收的征收额。