This article argues in defence of human–robot friendship. I begin by outlining the standard Aristotelian view of friendship, according to which there are certain necessary conditions which x must meet in order to ‘be a friend’. I explain how the current literature typically uses this Aristotelian view to object to human–robot friendships on theoretical and ethical grounds. Theoretically, a robot cannot be our friend because it cannot meet the requisite necessary conditions for friendship. Ethically, human–robot friendships are wrong because they are deceptive (the robot does not actually meet the conditions for being a friend), and could also make it more likely that we will favour ‘perfect’ robots, and disrespect, exploit, or exclude other human beings. To argue against the above position, I begin by outlining and assessing current attempts to reject the theoretical argument—that we cannot befriend robots. I argue that the current attempts are problematic, and do little to support the claim that we can be friends with robots now (rather than in some future time). I then use the standard Aristotelian view as a touchstone to develop a new degrees-of-friendship view. On my view, it is theoretically possible for humans to have some degree of friendship with social robots now. I explain how my view avoids ethical concerns about human–robot friendships being deceptive, and/or leading to the disrespect, exploitation, or exclusion of other human beings.

本文为人机友谊辩护。我首先概述了标准的亚里士多德友谊观，根据该观点，x 必须满足某些必要条件才能“成为朋友”。我解释了当前的文献通常如何使用这种亚里士多德的观点从理论和伦理的角度来反对人机友谊。从理论上讲，机器人不能成为我们的朋友，因为它不能满足成为友谊的必要条件。从伦理上讲，人机友谊是错误的，因为它们具有欺骗性（机器人实际上并没有满足成为朋友的条件），也可能使我们更有可能偏爱“完美”的机器人，而不尊重、剥削或排斥其他人。为了反驳上述立场，我首先概述和评估当前拒绝理论论点的尝试——我们不能与机器人交朋友。我认为当前的尝试是有问题的，并且几乎无法支持我们现在（而不是将来某个时间）可以与机器人成为朋友的说法。然后，我使用标准的亚里士多德观点作为试金石来开发新的友谊度观点。在我看来，理论上人类现在可以与社交机器人建立某种程度的友谊。我解释了我的观点如何避免关于人机友谊具有欺骗性和/或导致不尊重、剥削或排斥其他人的伦理问题。