This study investigates a regulator's dynamic policy to motivate firms' research on and adoption of green technology. In the proposed model, a firm makes unobservable efforts and can hide the technology's arrival from the regulator to avoid adoption costs. We find that the optimal policy follows a simple structure and induces part-time efforts, rather than the maximal effort reported in previous studies. In particular, the regulator should offer no subsidy before the arrival of a technology report, provide a one-time subsidy contingent upon that report, and always set a termination deadline. At the deadline, the firm is forced to select an external option that is associated with social costs. The optimal report-based subsidy decreases with time. Under the optimal policy, the firm works until an effort deadline, makes no effort thereafter, and reports the technology as soon as it arrives. This study also characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the optimal policy reduces to one that leads, in terms of throughout time, to effort that is maximal or minimal. Our results indicate that policymakers should implement a policy that compensates firms more in the present and less in the future.

中文翻译：

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信息不对称绿色技术创新应用动态监管

本研究调查了监管机构激励企业研究和采用绿色技术的动态政策。在提议的模型中，公司做出了不可观察的努力，并且可以向监管机构隐藏技术的到来，以避免采用成本。我们发现最优策略遵循一个简单的结构并诱导兼职努力，而不是先前研究中报告的最大努力。特别是，监管机构不应在技术报告到来之前提供补贴，根据该报告提供一次性补贴，并始终设定终止期限。在最后期限，公司被迫选择与社会成本相关的外部选项。最优的基于报告的补贴随着时间的推移而减少。在最优策略下，公司一直工作到努力的最后期限，此后不做任何努力，并在技术到达时立即报告。本研究还描述了最佳策略减少到导致在整个时间方面导致最大或最小努力的必要和充分条件。我们的结果表明，政策制定者应该实施一项政策，在当前对公司进行更多补偿，而在未来补偿更少。