In the traveller’s dilemma, a compelling argument seems to prescribe an intuitively irrational course of action. However, I argue all is not as it appears in the traveller’s dilemma; standard game-theoretic agents have a way out. To show this, I detail the key characteristics of the traveller’s dilemma, its underlying assumptions, and explain why we have an apparent conflict with what an idealized agent would intuitively do. I then argue that the backwards induction argument fails here because of the unique structure of the game. I conclude that we ought not focus our attention on the traveller’s dilemma.

中文翻译：

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旅行者困境的一个问题

在旅行者的困境中，一个令人信服的论点似乎规定了一种直觉上非理性的行动方案。然而，我认为一切都不是旅行者的困境中出现的那样。标准的博弈论代理有出路。为了证明这一点，我详细介绍了旅行者困境的关键特征、其基本假设，并解释了为什么我们与理想化代理人的直觉行为存在明显冲突。然后我争辩说，由于游戏的独特结构，反向归纳论证在这里失败了。我的结论是，我们不应该把注意力集中在旅行者的困境上。