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Spillovers and strategic interaction in immigration policies
Journal of Economic Geography ( IF 3.1 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-22 , DOI: 10.1093/jeg/lbaa035
Joseph-Simon Görlach 1 , Nicolas Motz 2
Affiliation  

Asylum policies are interdependent across countries: policy choices in one country can affect refugee flows into neighbouring countries and may provoke policy changes there, in an a priori unknown direction. We formulate a dynamic model of refugees’ location choices and of the strategic interaction among destinations that we fit to Syrian refugee migration to Europe. We find that south and southeastern European countries view recognition rates as strategic substitutes, whereas the same policies can be strategic complements in northern Europe. Our findings imply that regression frameworks which use cross-country variation to estimate the effects of recognition rates on immigration underestimate (overestimate) the effect if this policy is a strategic substitute (complement).

中文翻译:

移民政策中的溢出和战略互动

庇护政策在各个国家之间是相互依存的:一个国家的政策选择可能会影响难民向邻国的流入,并可能在一个先验未知的方向上引发那里的政策变化。我们制定了一个动态的难民地点选择模型,并建立了适合叙利亚难民向欧洲迁移的目的地之间的战略互动的动态模型。我们发现,欧洲南部和东南欧国家/地区将承认率视为战略替代品,而相同的政策可能是北欧的战略性补充。我们的研究结果表明,如果该策略是战略替代(补充),则使用跨国差异来估计识别率对移民的影响的回归框架会低估(高估)影响。
更新日期:2020-12-22
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