Critics of empathy—the capacity to share the mental lives of others—have charged that empathy is intrinsically biased. It occurs between no more than two people, and its key function is arguably to coordinate and align feelings, thoughts, and responses between those who are often already in close personal relationships. Because of this, critics claim that empathy is morally unnecessary at best and morally harmful at worst. This paper argues, however, that it is precisely because of its ability to connect people by coordinating and aligning their feelings, thoughts, and responses, that empathy is especially well suited to perform one particular moral task that has been largely overlooked in moral philosophical discussions. That is, helping people, including those who are antagonistically opposed on matters of moral, social, and political importance—what I call antagonistic moral opponents—find common ground: a set of shared beliefs, attitudes, values, or experiences that lays the requisite ground for even minimally positive relationships. Doing so can contribute to a number of morally, practically, and epistemically important outcomes, including resolving fraught disagreements, mitigating antagonism, promoting cooperation, learning from differences, and even forging positive relationships of various sorts. Contra critics, I therefore maintain that empathy is important for at least one area of the moral life.

移情的批评者（分享他人心理生活的能力）认为移情本质上是有偏见的。它发生在不超过两个人之间，并且其关键功能可以说是协调和调整经常已经有亲密个人关系的人们之间的感觉，思想和反应。因此，批评者声称，同情在道德上最好是不必要的，而在道德上则是有害的。然而，本文认为，正是由于它具有通过协调和调整人们的情感，思想和反应来联系人们的能力，所以同理心特别适合执行一项在道德哲学讨论中被严重忽视的特定道德任务。 。也就是说，帮助人们，包括在道德，社会，政治上的重要性（我称之为对立的道德反对者）找到了共同点：一系列共同的信念，态度，价值观或经验为即使是最低限度的积极关系也奠定了必要的基础。这样做可以促进许多道德上，实践上和认识论上的重要结果，包括解决烦恼的分歧，减轻对立，促进合作，从差异中学习，甚至建立各种积极的关系。相反，批评家们，我因此坚持同理心对道德生活的至少一个领域很重要。以及具有认识论意义的重要成果，包括解决烦恼的分歧，减轻对立，促进合作，从差异中学习，甚至建立各种积极的关系。相反，批评家们，我因此坚持同理心对道德生活的至少一个领域很重要。以及具有认识论意义的重要成果，包括解决烦恼的分歧，减轻对立，促进合作，从差异中学习，甚至建立各种积极的关系。相反，批评家们，我因此坚持同理心对道德生活的至少一个领域很重要。