Abstract

The security of nuclear power plants becomes an ever more important issue after the tragedy of the World Trade Center of New York City on September 11, 2000. Utilities around the world have significantly increased the resources used to enhance the security of nuclear power plants. In this study, a mathematical model based on Monte Carlo simulations is developed to calculate the probability of invaders being located in a building in the vital area, on a floor of the building, and in a region of the floor when invaders break into the vital area successfully.

In the model, it is assumed that invaders have no specific target to sabotage and they have no prior knowledge of the layout of the plant. Invaders are running around randomly in the vital area, and Monte Carlo simulations are used to trace their paths on a floor. The results can help the security of a nuclear power plant locate invaders in the vital area.

If it is assumed that the damage caused by the invaders is similar to the damage induced by a fire, the product of the probability of invaders being located in a region and the fire conditional core damage probability of the region ijk (CCDP_F,ijk) from a fire hazard probabilistic safety assessment can be used to prioritize the importance of the region to the risk of terrorist sabotage and to allocate resources that enhance physical protection. The summation of the product for all the region is the conditional core damage probability of terrorist attack (CCDP_S).

The surrogate plant used in the present study is a typical General Electric–designed Boiling Water Reactor-6 with Mark III containment. The vital area in this study has six entrances and three buildings: turbine, control, and auxiliary. Among the 196 regions considered in the analysis, the majority (between 85% and 92% for different entrances) have the P_ijk of locating terrorist probability of less than 10⁻². The top three average P_ijk regions are located in the turbine building. The eight regions with CCDP_F,ijk equal to 1.0 of the plant contribute 86.8% of the total average CCDP_S. Region AUX56, which is the corridor on the third floor of the auxiliary building, contributes 33.9% of the risk of core damage. Region AUX14, which is the corridor on the first floor of the auxiliary building, contributes 17.1% of this risk.

摘要

2000 年 9 月 11 日纽约市世贸中心惨案发生后，核电站的安全问题变得越来越重要。世界各地的公用事业公司都显着增加了用于加强核电站安全的资源。在这项研究中，开发了一个基于蒙特卡罗模拟的数学模型来计算入侵者在建筑物的重要区域、建筑物的地板上以及当入侵者闯入重要区域时位于建筑物内的概率。区域成功。

在模型中，假设入侵者没有特定的破坏目标，并且他们对工厂的布局没有先验知识。入侵者在关键区域随机跑来跑去，蒙特卡罗模拟用于追踪他们在地板上的路径。结果可以帮助核电站的安全定位重要区域的入侵者。

如果假设入侵者造成的破坏与火灾造成的破坏相似，则入侵者位于某个区域的概率与该区域的火灾条件核心破坏概率的乘积ijk (CCDP _F,ijk )火灾危险概率安全评估可用于优先考虑该地区对恐怖分子破坏风险的重要性，并分配资源以加强实物保护。所有区域的乘积之和就是恐怖袭击的条件核心破坏概率（CCDP _S）。

本研究中使用的替代设备是典型的通用电气设计的具有 Mark III 安全壳的沸水 Reactor-6。本研究中的重要区域有六个入口和三个建筑物：涡轮机、控制和辅助。在分析中考虑的196个区域中，大多数（不同入口的85%至92%之​​间）的定位恐怖分子的概率P _ijk小于10 ^-2。前三个平均 P _ijk区域位于涡轮机大楼内。CCDP _F,ijk等于1.0的8 个区域贡献了86.8% 的平均CCDP _S. 辅助建筑三楼走廊区域AUX56贡献了33.9%的核心损坏风险。AUX14 区域，即辅助建筑一层的走廊，贡献了 17.1% 的风险。