We experimentally study a situation in which two players negotiate the dissolution of a risky partnership. In our experiments, subjects must simultaneously negotiate both a selling price and the identity of the buyer. Upon reaching an agreement, one party (the buyer) will be subject to ex post risk, while the other party (the seller) will not, and the negotiation determines which party will hold the risk. Our results show that buyers extract a premium which is increasing in the riskiness of the partnership value distribution. Moreover, during bargaining, the majority of subjects make offers in which they would be the buyer (and thus exposed to risk) if the offer is accepted. Allowing subjects to communicate has noticeable effects: agreements are significantly more frequent and sorting according to fairness ideas – such that the buyer is the player with the higher “fair price” – is more frequent. We also show that, when subjects are able to communicate, bargaining pairs who discuss risk exposure or fairness generally agree to a lower price, giving greater compensation to risk for the buyer.

我们通过实验研究了一种情况，其中有两个参与者协商解散有风险的合伙企业。在我们的实验中，受试者必须同时协商售价和买方身份。达成协议后，一方（买方）将承担事后风险，而另一方（卖方）则没有事后风险，并且谈判确定哪一方承担风险。我们的结果表明，购买者获得了溢价，这增加了合伙企业价值分配的风险。此外，在讨价还价过程中，大多数对象提出要约，如果要约被接受，他们将成为买主（因此要承担风险）。允许受试者交流具有显着效果：协议的频率大大提高，并且按照公平观念进行分类（例如，买方是“公平价格”较高的参与者）更为频繁。我们还表明，当受试者能够交流时，讨论风险敞口或公平性的讨价还价对通常会同意较低的价格，从而为买方带来更大的风险补偿。