ABSTRACT

Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and a lack of detail in dreams can anyway be explained in terms of the underlying neural activity. In this paper, I develop how the sensorimotor enactivist should respond: dreams fail to replicate perceptual experiences because they are exhausted by what shows up at a given moment in phenomenal consciousness, while perceptual experiences go beyond this to include everything accessible via sensorimotor exploration. This difference permeates all levels of experience, so that dreams can't even replicate perceptual experiences of simple shapes and colors. Further, unlike detail and stability, there are not obvious neural explanations of this phenomenal difference.

摘要

梦为像 Alva Noë 这样的感觉运动激活主义者提供了一个令人信服的问题：它们似乎复制了我们的知觉体验，而没有感觉运动与远端感觉刺激的相互作用。诺埃回应说，由于缺乏细节和稳定性，梦实际上无法复制知觉体验。诺埃的反对者回答说，有些梦的细节丰富而稳定，而梦中的不稳定和缺乏细节无论如何都可以用潜在的神经活动来解释。在这篇论文中，我阐述了感觉运动执行主义者应该如何回应：梦无法复制知觉体验，因为它们被现象意识中特定时刻出现的东西耗尽，而感知体验则超越了这一点，包括通过感觉运动探索可以访问的一切。这种差异渗透到所有层次的体验中，以至于梦甚至无法复制简单形状和颜色的感知体验。此外，与细节和稳定性不同，这种现象差异没有明显的神经解释。