ABSTRACT

The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I end by arguing that this version of the Guise of the Good withstands standard objections.

中文翻译：

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正当理由的幌子

摘要

这篇论文论证了“Guise of the Good 论点”的一个版本，即如果某人作为实践推理的结果而行动，那么她会以她的前提共同为她的行动提供充分且不败的理由。我论证了这一点，首先，它是 Boghossian 的接受条件对实践推理推理的应用，其次，理论推理的接受条件的动机延续到实践推理。最后，我认为这个版本的善良伪装经得起标准的反对。