How do countries with differing political institutions respond to national crises? We examine policy responses to the coronavirus pandemic in a sample of 125 countries, using high frequency data on two measures: (i) containment policies, i.e., closure of public spaces and restrictions on movement of people, and (ii) health policies, i.e., public information campaigns, testing, and contact tracing. We have four main findings. First, non-democracies impose more stringent policies prior to their first Covid-19 case, but democracies close the gap in containment policies and surpass non-democracies in health policies within a week of registering their first case. Second, while policy responses do not differ by governance systems (presidential or parliamentary), elected leaders who performed better in the last election, or face an election farther in the future, impose more aggressive policies. Third, democracies with greater media freedom respond more slowly in containment policies, but more aggressively in health policies. Lastly, more conducive norms (such as trust in the elected government) systematically predict a more aggressive policy response. Our results remain robust to allowing countries with different economic, social, and medical characteristics to have different evolution of policy responses. Our analysis therefore suggests that political institutions and the incentives of the political leaders embedded therein significantly shape the policy response of governments to a national crisis.

政治制度不同的国家如何应对国家危机？我们在 125 个国家/地区的样本中检查了对冠状病毒大流行的政策反应，使用了两项措施的高频数据：(i) 遏制政策，即关闭公共场所和限制人员流动，以及 (ii) 卫生政策，即、公共信息活动、测试和接触者追踪。我们有四个主要发现。首先，非民主国家在他们的第一例 Covid-19 病例之前实施了更严格的政策，但民主国家在登记第一例病例后的一周内缩小了遏制政策的差距，并在卫生政策方面超过了非民主国家。Second, while policy responses do not differ by governance systems (presidential or parliamentary), elected leaders who performed better in the last election, 或在更远的未来面临选举，实施更激进的政策。第三，媒体自由度更高的民主国家在遏制政策方面反应较慢，但在卫生政策方面反应更为积极。最后，更有利的规范（例如对民选政府的信任）系统地预测更积极的政策反应。我们的结果仍然稳健，允许具有不同经济、社会和医疗特征的国家有不同的政策反应演变。因此，我们的分析表明，政治制度和其中政治领导人的激励措施显着影响了政府对国家危机的政策反应。但在卫生政策方面更加积极。最后，更有利的规范（例如对民选政府的信任）系统地预测更积极的政策反应。我们的结果仍然稳健，允许具有不同经济、社会和医疗特征的国家有不同的政策反应演变。因此，我们的分析表明，政治制度和其中政治领导人的激励措施显着影响了政府对国家危机的政策反应。但在卫生政策方面更加积极。最后，更有利的规范（例如对民选政府的信任）系统地预测更积极的政策反应。我们的结果仍然稳健，允许具有不同经济、社会和医疗特征的国家有不同的政策反应演变。因此，我们的分析表明，政治制度和其中政治领导人的激励措施显着影响了政府对国家危机的政策反应。