ABSTRACT

British and Italian representatives signed a series of accords, commonly called the Easter Accords, on 16 April 1938. The various agreements aimed to settle several outstanding issues between the two governments and, on the surface, it appeared that both Powers had committed to observe the status quo in the Mediterranean. Two years later, however, fascist Italy and Britain were at war. This analysis argues that Italian foreign policy had three over-arching goals that led Rome to sign the Accords. It wanted to secure definitive British de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and recognition that Italy was an equal empire with rights in the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, wanted to isolate France from its potential British ally. Italian diplomats and officials also thought that they could use the negotiations to weaken the influence of Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. The limited, tactical scope of Italian policy meant little chance existed of reaching a genuine rapprochement.

摘要

1938年4月16日，英国和意大利代表签署了一系列协议，通常称为《复活节协议》。各种协议旨在解决两国政府之间的一些悬而未决的问题，表面上看来，两个大国都承诺遵守《协定》。地中海的现状。但是，两年后，法西斯的意大利和英国发动了战争。该分析认为，意大利的外交政策具有三个总体目标，导致罗马签署了《协定》。它想确保法定的英国法律承认意大利征服埃塞俄比亚，并承认意大利是在地中海和红海盆地享有权利的平等帝国。意大利独裁者贝尼托·墨索里尼（Benito Mussolini）希望将法国与其潜在的英国盟友隔离开。意大利外交官和官员们还认为，他们可以利用谈判削弱英国外交大臣安东尼·伊甸园的影响。意大利政策的战术范围有限，这意味着达成真正和解的机会很小。