While no one denies that science depends on epistemic values, many philosophers of science have wrestled with the appropriate role of non-epistemic values, such as social, ethical, and political values. Recently, philosophers of science have overwhelmingly accepted that non-epistemic values should play a legitimate role in science. The recent philosophical debate has shifted from the value-free ideal in science to questions about how science should incorporate non-epistemic values. This article engages with such questions through an exploration of the environmental sciences. These sciences are a mosaic of diverse fields characterized by interdisciplinarity, problem-orientation, policy-directedness, and ubiquitous non-epistemic values. This article addresses a frequently voiced concern about many environmental science practices: that they ‘crowd out’ or displace significant non-epistemic values by either (1) entailing some non-epistemic values, rather than others, or by (2) obscuring discussion of non-epistemic values altogether. With three detailed case studies – monetizing nature, nature-society dualism, and ecosystem health – we show that the alleged problem of crowding out emerges from active debates within the environmental sciences. In each case, critics charge that the scientific practice in question displaces non-epistemic values in at least one of the two senses distinguished above. We show that crowding out is neither necessary nor always harmful when it occurs. However, we do see these putative objections to the application of environmental science as teaching valuable lessons about what matters for successful environmental science, all things considered. Given the significant role that many environmental scientists see for non-epistemic values in their fields, we argue that these cases motivate lessons about the importance of value-flexibility (that practices can accommodate a plurality of non-epistemic values), transparency about value-based decisions that inform practice, and environmental pragmatism.

虽然没有人否认科学依赖于认知价值，但许多科学哲学家一直在与非认知价值的适当角色作斗争，例如社会、伦理和政治价值。最近，科学哲学家们压倒性地接受了非认知价值应该在科学中发挥合法作用的观点。最近的哲学辩论已经从科学中没有价值的理想转变为关于科学应该如何纳入非认知价值的问题。本文通过对环境科学的探索来解决这些问题。这些科学是由跨学科、以问题为导向、以政策为导向和无处不在的非认知价值为特征的不同领域的马赛克。本文解决了对许多环境科学实践的经常表达的担忧：他们通过以下两种方式“排挤”或取代重要的非认知价值：（1）包含一些非认知价值，而不是其他价值，或者（2）完全模糊对非认知价值的讨论。通过三个详细的案例研究——自然货币化、自然-社会二元论和生态系统健康——我们表明，所谓的排挤问题源于环境科学内部的积极辩论。在每种情况下，批评者都指责所讨论的科学实践在上述两种意义上的至少一种中取代了非认知价值。我们表明，排挤既不是必要的，也不是总是有害的。然而，我们确实将这些对环境科学应用的推定反对视为教授有价值的课程，了解对成功的环境科学而言什么是重要的，所有事情都考虑在内。