This paper defends a rational account of conceivability according to which conceiving is a kind of modal thinking that is distinct from imagining effectively allowing us to think beyond what we can imagine, and that we are subject to rational rather than experiential constraints when we do so. Defending this view involves appealing to the perspective of an idealized agent and I’ll argue that this appeal is not worrisome given an “objective” view of propositional justification.

中文翻译：

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超越想象的思考

本文捍卫了对可想像性的理性解释，根据这种解释，构想是一种模态思维，与有效想象不同，它可以有效地使我们思考超出想象的范围，并且在这样做时，我们受到的是理性的约束，而不是经验上的约束。捍卫这一观点涉及诉诸理想化代理人的观点，而我认为鉴于命题辩护的“客观”观点，这种呼吁并不令人担忧。