Purpose

This paper attempts to examine the nature of the relationship between employee stock ownership (ESO) and value creation in the context of shareholder governance.

Design/methodology/approach

The research sample includes 129 French CAC All-Tradable index companies observed from 2015 to 2019. The system generalised moment (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used in the dynamic panel.

Findings

The results estimated from the system GMM model show a threshold effect in the ESO–value creation relationship. For an employee shareholding ratio less than 3%, ESO has a positive impact on value creation; above this level, the impact becomes negative. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship largely depends on the form of employee shareholding.

Research limitations/implications

These results are with strong economic implications. The risk of CEO entrenchment increases with the rise in share parts owned by employees. Companies with high shareholder value creation are companies with low employee ownership.

Originality/value

The main contribution in this study is that the form of ESO was considered in our analysis, which was not done in previous research. Another contribution is the use of recent data (2015–2019), which takes into account the large-scale development of French ESO practices, especially the absence of crises that may bias the results.

中文翻译：

---

员工持股和价值创造：来自系统 GMM 估计的证据

目的

本文试图在股东治理的背景下研究员工持股 (ESO) 与价值创造之间关系的性质。

设计/方法/方法

研究样本包括2015年至2019年观察到的129家法国CAC All-Tradable指数公司。动态面板中使用系统广义矩（GMM）估计量（Blundell and Bond，1998）。

发现

从系统 GMM 模型估计的结果显示了 ESO-价值创造关系中的阈值效应。对于低于3%的员工持股比例，ESO对价值创造有积极影响；超过这个水平，影响就会变成负面。此外，这种关系的性质在很大程度上取决于员工持股的形式。

研究限制/影响

这些结果具有很强的经济意义。CEO 固守的风险随着员工持股比例的增加而增加。具有高股东价值创造的公司是低员工持股的公司。

原创性/价值

本研究的主要贡献是在我们的分析中考虑了 ESO 的形式，这在以前的研究中没有进行。另一个贡献是使用了最近的数据（2015-2019），其中考虑了法国 ESO 实践的大规模发展，特别是没有可能使结果产生偏差的危机。