We estimate the effect of acquisition performance and acquisition activity on CEO compensation for the full set of CEOs of large public U.S. corporations in the Execucomp database over the period 1992–2016. Most previous work has focused on publicly traded acquisition targets. We focus on the comparison between public and private targets, showing significant differences between the two. One primary finding, based on panel data regressions (using both fixed and random effects) is that the performance of private acquisitions, as measured by abnormal announcement returns, has a statistically significant positive effect of plausible economic magnitude on CEO compensation. Public acquisitions exhibit a smaller positive effect that is statistically insignificant. For both, acquisition activity (number of acquisitions) has a statistically significant positive effect on compensation. Our main results suggest that agency considerations are important for both public and private acquisitions but are more important for public acquisitions.

中文翻译：

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比较公共和私人收购的CEO薪酬效果

我们估算了Execucomp数据库中1992年至2016年期间收购绩效和收购活动对美国大型上市公司首席执行官的CEO薪酬的影响。先前的大多数工作都集中在公开交易的收购目标上。我们着眼于公共目标与私人目标之间的比较，显示出两者之间的显着差异。基于面板数据回归（同时使用固定效应和随机效应）的一项主要发现是，以异常公告收益衡量的私人收购的业绩在合理的经济规模上对CEO薪酬具有统计上显着的积极影响。公共收购显示出较小的积极影响，从统计上讲是微不足道的。对彼此而言，购置活动（购置数量）对报酬具有统计学上显着的积极影响。我们的主要结果表明，代理机构的考虑因素对于公共和私人收购均很重要，但对于公共收购则更为重要。