To avoid the problem of regress, externalists have put forward defeaters-based accounts of justification. The paper argues that existing proposals face two serious concerns: (i) They fail to accommodate related counterexamples such as Norman the clairvoyant, and, more worryingly, (ii) they fail to explain how one can be epistemically responsible in holding basic beliefs—i.e., they fail to explain how basic beliefs can avoid being arbitrary from the agent’s point of view. To solve both of these problems, a new, externalist, defeaters-based account of justification is offered—viz., System Reliabilism. The core message of the view—and the way it deals with both (i) and (ii)—is the claim that the justificatory status of justified basic beliefs originates from being the undefeated outputs of a reliable, cognitively integrated system that is capable of defeating them. Simply put, to be candidates for being justified, basic beliefs must be epistemically responsible and to be so they must be undefeated while being defeasible. The paper also offers a detailed, naturalistic analysis of the notion of cognitive integration. This long-due, mechanistic account of cognitive integration is then used to argue that an additional advantage of System Reliabilism is its unique position to account for the as yet unexplained intuition that responsible beliefs are also likely to be true.

为了避免退步问题，外部主义者提出了基于失败者的理由说明。该论文认为，现有建议面临两个严重问题：（i）无法适应相关的反例，例如通灵的诺曼（Norman）；更令人担忧的是，（ii）他们无法解释在坚持基本信念方面如何在认识论上负责任，即，他们无法解释从代理人的角度来看基本信念如何能够避免被任意支配。为了解决这两个问题，提供了一种新的，基于外在主义，基于失败者的理由说明，即系统可靠性。。的视图和方式的核心信息它用涉及（ⅰ）和（ii）-is声称有理基本信念起源的正当性状态从一个可靠，不败输出认知集成系统，该系统能够的打败他们。简而言之，要成为正当的候选人，基本信念必须是认识论上负责任的，并且要在不可行的情况下保持不败。本文还对认知整合的概念进行了详细的，自然主义的分析。然后，这种对认知整合的机制性解释被认为是系统可靠性的另一个优势是其独特的地位，可以解释至今尚无法解释的直觉。负责任的信念也可能是正确的。