We investigate the impact of government subsidy schemes and channel power structure on the level of innovation in a two-tier supply chain. Our results indicate that consumer subsidies are more effective than producer subsidies in promoting innovation investment for a given channel power structure. Regardless of the power structure, supply chain members, consumers and society benefit more from consumer subsidies. If government subsidies are absent, innovation investment is higher when neither member of the supply chain dominates, and consumer surplus and social welfare are also higher in the Nash game. Under the consumer subsidy scheme, although government expenditures are higher in the manufacturer-led game, innovation investment is the same under different power structures, and consumer surplus and social welfare are also, in turn, the same. Under the producer subsidy scheme, the manufacturer invests more in innovation, and government expenditure is also higher when the retailer dominates the supply chain. Under producer subsidies, consumers and society benefit from the presence of powerful retailers when the investment cost is lower, and consumer surplus and social welfare have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the retailer’s power otherwise.

我们调查了政府补贴计划和渠道权力结构对两级供应链中创新水平的影响。我们的结果表明，在给定渠道权力结构下，消费者补贴比生产者补贴更有效地促进了创新投资。无论权力结构如何，供应链成员，消费者和社会都会从消费者补贴中受益更多。如果没有政府补贴，则在供应链中没有任何一方占主导地位的情况下，创新投资会更高，在纳什博弈中，消费者剩余和社会福利也会更高。在消费者补贴计划下，尽管在制造商主导的博弈中政府支出较高，但在不同的权力结构下创新投资是相同的，而消费者剩余和社会福利也将相同。在生产者补贴计划下，制造商在创新上投入更多，当零售商在供应链中占主导地位时，政府支出也将增加。在生产者补贴下，当投资成本较低时，消费者和社会将从强大的零售商的存在中受益，否则，消费者剩余和社会福利与零售商的权力呈倒U形关系。