Perhaps the greatest determinant of individual and societal welfare is who raises children and with what degree of discretion. Philosophers have endeavored in myriad ways to provide normative justification for ascribing a right to be a legal parent and to possess particular legal powers as a parent. This Article shows why they fail and offers an alternative theoretical framework for delimiting parental rights. The prevailing tendency in philosophical writing on the topic is to begin with observations and intuitions specific to parent-child relationships. Against that tendency, this Article demonstrates the need to begin with principles at a high level of generality, covering a broad range of human relationships. This yields a much more limited moral right in connection with parenthood than do accounts that fail to generalize.

个人和社会福利的最大决定因素也许是谁抚养孩子以及以何种程度的自由裁量权。哲学家千方百计地为赋予合法父母身份和作为父母拥有特殊法律权力的权利提供规范依据。本文说明了他们为什么会失败，并提供了界定父母权利的替代性理论框架。关于该主题的哲学写作的主要趋势是始于对亲子关系特定的观察和直觉。与这种趋势相反，本条表明有必要从高度概括性的原则入手，涵盖广泛的人际关系。与无法概括的说法相比，与父母身份有关的道德权利受到的限制要多得多。