According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject to the illusion of phenomenal consciousness consists in having this disposition. I explain our ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness (Chalmers 2018)—that our sensory states bear phenomenal properties that are qualitatively like something with which we are directly acquainted that is ineffable, atomic, intrinsic (non-relational), private, and non-physical. I also address the illusion meta-problem (Kammerer 2019a), which is to explain why illusionism seems especially counterintuitive.

根据幻觉，现象意识是一种内省的幻觉。的错觉问题（法兰克2016）是解释错觉的原因，为什么我们正在有力地设置法官被错误地认为我们是惊人意识。我提出了一种解决幻觉问题的理论。我认为这是基于三个关于思维的假设的，它们被称为内省的不透明性，无误的直觉和称义约束-我们可以内省地解释自己的性格，以得出关于我们的感觉状态的错误的无意识推论。受现象意识幻觉的影响在于具有这种倾向。我解释了我们关于意识的“问题直觉”（Chalmers，2018年），即我们的感觉状态具有非凡的性质，这些性质在质上类似于我们直接了解的事物，它们是无法理解的，原子的，内在的（非关系的），私人的和非身体的。我还解决了幻觉元问题（Kammerer 2019a），这是为了解释为什么幻觉似乎特别违反直觉。