One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal.

任何适当的知觉考虑的必要条件之一就是是否存在无意识知觉。问题很复杂，哲学和科学方面的争论都在增加。在本文中，我们考虑了无意识感知的情况，提供了三个主要成就。首先，我们讨论中央协调机构这一概念的未明确定义，这一概念对于据称感知国家不属于个人，因而并非真正感知者的论点至关重要。我们阐明了中央协调机构可以用来代表行为的代表国的含义。其次，利用这个解释，我们在一系列关于行动的眼光，扫视和熟练打字的经验工作中，对国家对个人的可归属性进行了更为仔细的理解。结果给怀疑者施加了关于无意识感知的压力。第三，反思关于无意识知觉的辩论中的更广泛的哲学主题，我们强调我们的讨论如何对知觉是一种明显的而非自然的观点施加压力。通过这样做，我们抵制了关于无意识感知的辩论仅仅是言语的诱人抱怨。我们强调我们的讨论如何对感知是一种明显的而非自然的看法施加压力。通过这样做，我们抵制了关于无意识感知的辩论仅仅是言语的诱人抱怨。我们强调我们的讨论如何对感知是一种明显的而非自然的看法施加压力。通过这样做，我们抵制了关于无意识感知的辩论仅仅是言语的诱人抱怨。