Reviewed by:

• Risking Immeasurable Harm: Immigration Restriction and U.S.–Mexican Diplomatic Relations, 1924–1932 by Benjamin C. Montoya
• Aaron W. Navarro

The first great change elucidated in this fine new book is the pressure that Mexico and other Latin American countries brought to bear on the United States to begin treating immigration as an international rather than a domestic matter. The second is the way that the importance of U.S.–Mexican relations swayed immigration policy, with the State Department itself demolishing the case for a numerical quota on Mexican immigrants. As Montoya notes, "administrative restriction was the perfect compromise between a Westphalian sense of national sovereignty and a Wilsonian notion of more cooperative diplomatic relations" (250).

U.S. immigration policy was traditionally handled as a domestic matter, taking into account economic needs, expanding territorial boundaries, and explicit concerns about supposed racial characteristics. The Immigration Act of 1924 tightened the existing quota-based system that sought to constrict the flow of migrants from large sending nations such as Italy and Poland. Cultural arguments were paramount in limiting these groups, and overt racism abounded. This model of a quota on what were considered undesirable migrants was the goal of restrictionists who "believed Mexicans [End Page 492] were racially inferior and a hazard to U.S. society and its institutions" (126). Montoya ably discusses the variables that made Mexican immigration different: it was seasonal, it was critical to agriculture in the Southwest and Texas, and it was locally common but invisible in Washington, D.C. In addition, Mexico's geographic position, with a long land border, made the bilateral relationship with the United States a special diplomatic and strategic environment. Plus, after the population dislocations of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico was attempting to consolidate its national government, a process that would benefit U.S. interests.

The twist in Montoya's story is that restrictionists in Congress were opposed by the State Department, which argued that singling out Mexico for an immigration quota "would bring embarrassment on the Mexican people, poison U.S.–Mexican relations, and threaten U.S. diplomacy with the rest of Latin America" (66–67). The State Department pushed for a non-confrontational way to reduce Mexican immigration: administrative restriction. The strategy was "to enforce strictly existing immigration laws that excluded the entry of immigrants into the United States who were illiterate, diseased, or likely to become public charges" (245). Experts like Manuel Gamio testified before Congress in 1930 with the geopolitical argument that "the quota would undermine the long-term structural solution to the immigration problem—Mexico's political stability" (199).

The second front against the quota was full of Latin American diplomats. In one of the most intriguing parts of the book, Montoya dissects U.S.–Mexico negotiations at the Second Conference on Emigration and Immigration in Havana in 1928, writing that it was "the closest both nations would come to brokering a bilateral treaty on immigration before the 1940s" (123). By dragging the issue of immigration into the international arena, Latin American states acted in unison to limit Washington's latitude to go it alone with its own numerical (and racial) goals. Mexican diplomat Francisco Suástegui's notes from congressional hearings in February 1928 offer readers a microscopic view of the restrictionists' 'kitchen sink' strategy of arguing for a quota.

The push to enforce a quota on Mexican immigration ended in 1932 for several reasons. The pressure of the State Department was effective, "Administrative restriction slowed legal immigration … [and] the Great Depression curbed illegal immigration" (128). The U.S. would not revisit the issue of Mexican immigration until the Bracero program began in 1942 under wartime pressures.

Montoya has written an elegant study of the deep historical roots of immigration policy and the challenges of asymmetric diplomatic engagement. His ability to weave together U.S. and Mexican diplomatic sources is exemplary. This analysis will surely be enlightening for students, scholars, and policymakers alike. [End Page 493]

审核人：

• 冒着无法估量的危害的风险：移民限制与美墨外交关系，1924-1932年，本杰明·蒙托亚（Benjamin C. Montoya）
• 亚伦·纳瓦罗（Aaron W.Navarro）

这本精美的新书中阐明的第一个重大变化是墨西哥和其他拉丁美洲国家对美国施加的压力，要求它们开始将移民视为国际事务而不是国内事务。第二个问题是美国与墨西哥关系的重要性影响了移民政策，而国务院本身也取消了对墨西哥移民实行定量配额的理由。正如蒙托亚所指出的那样，“行政限制是威斯特伐利亚国家主权意识与威尔逊主义的更加合作的外交关系概念之间的完美折衷”（250）。

传统上，美国移民政策是作为国内事务处理的，考虑到经济需求，不断扩大的领土边界以及对所谓种族特征的明确担忧。1924年的《移民法》收紧了现有的基于配额的制度，该制度试图限制来自意大利和波兰等大型派遣国的移民。在限制这些群体方面，文化争论至为重要，而且种族主义盛行。这种限制所谓的配额制的模式是“相信墨西哥人的限制主义者”的目标[End Page 492]（126）。蒙托亚合理地讨论了使墨西哥移民与众不同的变量：这是季节性的，对西南和德克萨斯州的农业至关重要，在当地很普遍，但看不到在华盛顿特区此外，墨西哥由于地缘边界长，使与美国的双边关系成为特殊的外交和战略环境，此外，在墨西哥大革命造成人口流离失所之后，墨西哥正试图巩固其国民地位。政府，这将有利于美国利益。

蒙托亚故事的转折点是，国会的限制主义者遭到了国务院的反对，国务院认为，单单将墨西哥列入移民配额“将给墨西哥人民带来尴尬，毒害美墨关系，并威胁美国与其他国家的外交拉丁美洲”（66-67岁）。国务院敦促采取一种非对抗性的方式来减少墨西哥的移民：行政限制。该策略是“严格执行现行的移民法律，该法律禁止文盲，患病或可能成为公共指控的移民进入美国”（245）。像曼努埃尔·加米（Manuel Gamio）这样的专家于1930年在国会作证时提出了地缘政治论点，即“配额将破坏移民问题的长期结构性解决方案-墨西哥”

反对配额的第二战线充满了拉丁美洲的外交官。在这本书中最引人入胜的部分之一中，蒙托亚剖析了1928年在哈瓦那举行的第二届移民与移民会议上的美墨谈判，并写道：“这是两国在签署《关于移民的双边条约》之前达成的最紧密的协议。 1940年代”（123）。通过将移民问题拖到国际舞台上，拉美国家一致采取行动，限制华盛顿的宽容范围，使其自己实现其数字（和种族）目标。墨西哥外交官弗朗西斯科·苏斯泰吉（FranciscoSuástegui）在1928年2月的国会听证会上的笔记为读者提供了对限制主义者争夺配额的“厨房水槽”策略的微观看法。

出于多种原因，在1932年结束了对墨西哥移民实行配额制的努力。国务院的压力是有效的，“行政限制减缓了合法移民……[和大萧条”遏制了非法移民”（128）。直到1942年在战时压力下开始实施Bracero计划，美国才会重新考虑墨西哥移民问题。

蒙托亚（Montoya）对移民政策的深厚历史渊源和不对称外交参与的挑战进行了出色的研究。他编织美国和墨西哥外交资源的能力堪称典范。这种分析肯定会为学生，学者和决策者带来启发。[完页493]