As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent ‘cyber annoyances’ holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.

中文翻译：

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北约的网络攻击：挑战与机遇

作为对俄罗斯入侵克里米亚的回应，北约回归了威慑和集体防御的核心军事概念。北约的这种适应最近开始包括尝试将进攻性网络影响整合到北约部队结构和响应条令中。文章认为——与公开宣称的相反——这种整合对加强北约的威慑态势几乎没有作用，也不太可能威慑低于集体防御门槛的非军事、混合网络活动。本文确定了当前整合工作面临的几个实际挑战，包括开发利用、战斗损害评估和消除冲突的时间维度。考虑到这些挑战，这篇文章表明，部署会导致持续的“网络烦恼”的次要且资源较少的网络效应具有未被重视的潜力，因为它们会耗尽对手的资源，扰乱重要的 IT 系统并使决策复杂化。文章最后指出，北约不应将其集体防御条款调整到网络空间。在网络空间中更积极的北约可能会破坏迄今为止阻止升级的网络情报规范，从而增加俄罗斯将情报和积极的网络防御活动误解为军事准备、军备或正在进行的攻击的可能性。