Abstract

This article explores the role played by Israel’s unique nuclear posture in the Arab-Israeli inter-state conflict over the past five decades since Israel became an undeclared nuclear state. It is the first attempt of its kind to conduct an historical analysis that aims at exploring both the Israeli and the Arab side, as it pertains to the effects of Israel’s nuclear deterrence. It is argued that over the years Israel adopted a multi-layered deterrence model: overt conventional and covert nuclear deterrence. The conventional deterrence was meant to dissuade Arab countries from threatening Israel’s strategic interests, while the nuclear deterrence was meant to forestall threats to the state’s intrinsic interests. The empirical research on Israel’s nuclear deterrence from the perspective of the deterred country – Iraq under Saddam – substantiated this study’s main thesis, namely that Israeli nuclear deterrence played a central role in the decision-making processes of various Arab national leaders, despite the policy of opacity that Israel adopted in the nuclear sphere. The Saddam Hussein documents reveal the “smoking gun” – extensive evidence that the Iraqi leader perceived Israel’s nuclear capability as the greatest obstacle to Iraq and to the other Arab countries interested in continuing the war against Israel.

摘要

本文探讨了自以色列成为一个未宣布的核国家以来的过去 50 年中，以色列独特的核态势在阿以国家间冲突中所扮演的角色。这是首次尝试进行历史分析，旨在探索两者以色列和阿拉伯方面，因为它涉及以色列核威慑的影响。有人认为，多年来以色列采用了多层次的威慑模式：公开的常规核威慑和隐蔽的核威慑。常规威慑旨在阻止阿拉伯国家威胁以色列的战略利益，而核威慑旨在阻止对国家内在利益的威胁。从被威慑国家——萨达姆统治下的伊拉克——角度对以色列核威慑的实证研究证实了本研究的主要论点，即以色列核威慑在阿拉伯各国领导人的决策过程中发挥了核心作用，尽管采取了以色列在核领域采取的不透明性。