This paper explores the extent to which bargaining power asymmetries among supply chain members moderate the effect that the delay costs of the setting exert on negotiation outcomes. First, we propose that the influence of delay costs on the initial gap between the bargaining demands of sellers and buyers (i.e., initial bargaining gap) decreases when buyers have a bargaining power advantage over sellers. Second, we posit that this moderation effect reduces the indirect effect that the delay costs have on negotiation outcomes (via the initial bargaining gap). To test these notions, we conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with undergraduate students from a large European university in which we manipulate the relative bargaining power and delay costs of the setting. We conduct our analysis with 292 observations. Our findings support our theoretical predictions. Specifically, results indicate that bargaining power moderates (i.e., reduces) the effect of the delay costs on negotiation processes by reducing their influence on the initial bargaining gap. Likewise, our analysis shows that because more powerful buyers are less likely to modify their behavior as a result of the delay costs, they face a higher risk of obtaining suboptimal bargaining profits.

本文探讨了供应链成员之间的讨价还价能力不对称在多大程度上缓和了设置的延迟成本对谈判结果的影响。首先，我们建议，当买方相对于卖方具有议价能力优势时，延迟成本对卖方和买方的议价需求之间的初始缺口（即初始议价缺口）的影响会减小。其次，我们认为这种适度的影响减少了延迟成本对谈判结果的间接影响（通过最初的讨价还价缺口）。为了测试这些概念，我们对来自欧洲某大型大学的本科生进行了2×2的主题间实验，在其中我们操纵了相对的议价能力并延迟了设置的成本。我们用292个观测值进行分析。我们的发现支持我们的理论预测。具体而言，结果表明，议价能力通过减少延迟成本对初始议价差距的影响来缓和（即减少）延迟成本对谈判流程的影响。同样，我们的分析表明，由于功能强大的买方由于延迟成本而不太可能改变其行为，因此他们面临获得次优议价利润的较高风险。