We consider second-price auctions with participation costs and investigate the revenue effects of a resale possibility. There are two potential bidders whose valuations are independently and identically distributed, and each bidder must incur a participation cost to bid in the auction. Due to these costs, there may be a resale opportunity in an otherwise efficient second-price auction. We show that when values are drawn from a uniform distribution, resale increases (decreases) entry of the lower-(higher-)cost bidder and decreases the original seller’s expected revenue.

中文翻译：

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转售会损害第二价格拍卖中的原始卖方吗？

我们考虑包含参与成本的第二价格拍卖，并研究转售可能性的收益影响。有两个潜在的竞标者，其估值是独立且均匀分布的，每个竞标者必须招致参与成本才能竞标。由于这些成本，在其他有效的第二价格拍卖中可能会有转售机会。我们表明，当从均匀分布中提取价值时，转售增加（减少）了成本较低（较高）的投标人的条目，并降低了原始卖方的预期收入。