Many philosophers working on virtue theory have resisted the idea that the virtues are practical skills, apparently following Aristotle’s resistance to that idea. Bucking the trend, Matt Stichter defends a strong version of this idea in The Skillfulness of Virtue by marshaling a wide range of conceptual and empirical arguments to argue that the moral virtues are robust skills involving the cognitive-conative unification of Aristotelian phronêsis (‘practical intelligence’). Here I argue that Aristotle overlooks a more delimited kind of practical intelligence, strongly analogous to his own account of phronêsis, that unifies complex forms of expertise such as medicine or even high-level sports. Insofar as the skill model of virtue is compelling, it must draw on a robust conception of practical expertise (technê) like the one developed here rather than the ordinary, anemic conception of practical skills.

许多从事美德理论研究的哲学家都抵制了美德是实践技能的观点，这显然是亚里士多德对这种观点的反驳。逆势而动，马特Stichter捍卫这种想法的强烈版本美德的技巧性地通过编组广泛的理论和实证论据争辩说，美德是涉及亚里士多德的认知，意动统一强大的技能，实践智慧（“实践智慧'）。在这里，我认为亚里斯多德忽视了一种更为划定的实用情报，这与他自己对“ phronêsis”的描述非常相似，将医学或什至是高水平运动等复杂的专业知识形式统一起来。就美德的技能模型而言，它必须采用扎实的实用技能（如技术）概念，而不是普通的，消极的实用技能概念。