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CEO vs. COO: shareholder perceptions of M&A announcements based on insider trades
Managerial Finance ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-30 , DOI: 10.1108/mf-07-2020-0369
Vinh Huy Nguyen , Carolina Gomez , Suchi Mishra , Ali M. Parhizgari

Purpose

We examine how the net share purchases of top executives of acquiring firms, specifically the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Operating Officer (COO), can impact shareholder perceptions of a merger and acquisition (M&A) around the announcement time.

Design/methodology/approach

Regression tests using the post-announcement cumulative returns as the dependent variables, and CEO and COO net purchases as independent test controlling for the net purchases of all other insiders, COO and CEO ownership, exercised options, unexercised exercisable options, merger type, pre-announcement firm size, past performance, industry growth, industry instability, year and industry fixed effects. The regression tests are used for various sub-samples (i.e. non-contemporaneous events, duality, operational complexity, economic conditions).

Findings

We find that overall shareholders value the COO's net purchases before the announcement but not those of the CEOs. If the COO is also the CEO, then executive buy-ins appear to have a negative reaction from the shareholders. When the firm has many business segments or when the announcement is made in an economic recession, the COO's net purchases do not have a positive influence on the shareholders.

Originality/value

We are the first to provide evidence that investors pay attention to the COO around M&A announcements. In the age of celebrity CEOs, who can instantaneously change the stock price with one press release, having another executive that can shape the opinion of investors can diversify the agency risk.



中文翻译:

CEO vs. COO:股东对基于内幕交易的并购公告的看法

目的

我们研究了收购公司的高管,特别是首席执行官 (CEO) 和首席运营官 (COO) 的净股份购买如何影响股东对并购 (M&A) 在公告时间前后的看法。

设计/方法/方法

回归测试使用公告后累积回报作为因变量,CEO 和 COO 净购买作为独立测试控制所有其他内部人的净购买、COO 和 CEO 所有权、已行使的期权、未行使的可行使期权、合并类型、预公告公司规模、过往业绩、行业增长、行业不稳定性、年份和行业固定效应。回归测试用于各种子样本(即非同期事件、二元性、操作复杂性、经济条件)。

发现

我们发现,整体股东重视首席运营官在公告前的净购买,而不是首席执行官的价值。如果首席运营官也是首席执行官,那么高管的买入似乎会引起股东的负面反应。当公司有很多业务部门或在经济衰退时发布公告时,首席运营官的净购买不会对股东产生积极影响。

原创性/价值

我们是第一个提供证据表明投资者关注并购公告的首席运营官。在名人CEO时代,一个新闻稿可以瞬间改变股价,拥有另一个可以影响投资者意见的高管可以分散代理风险。

更新日期:2021-03-30
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