ABSTRACT

A number of authors have recently advanced a ‘disjunctivist’ view of the rationalising explanation of action, on which rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because p’ are explanations of a fundamentally different kind from rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because she believed that p’. Less attempt has been made to explicitly articulate the case against this view. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I develop a detailed version of what I take to be the basic argument against disjunctivism, drawing on a framework of explanatory proportionality. The disjunctivist cannot reject this framework, I argue, because they need it to respond to another challenge, from psychological individualism. As I explain, however, the proportionality-based challenge is not in principle insurmountable, and I outline a number of ways in which a case for disjunctivism might be developed in response to it. The paper thus clarifies the dialectic around disjunctivism about the rationalisation of action and, specifically, what advocates of the view must do in order to make a compelling case for it.

摘要

一些作者最近提出了对行为的合理化解释的“析取主义”观点，在这种观点上，'S A'd 因为 p' 形式的合理化是一种与'S A'd 形式的合理化根本不同的解释。因为她相信 p'。较少尝试明确阐明反对这种观点的案例。本文试图纠正这种情况。我开发了一个详细版本的我认为是反对分离主义的基本论点，利用解释性比例框架。我认为，分离主义者不能拒绝这个框架，因为他们需要它来应对来自心理个人主义的另一个挑战。然而，正如我所解释的，基于比例的挑战原则上并非不可克服，并且我概述了一些可以针对它发展析取主义案例的方法。因此，本文阐明了围绕分离主义关于行动合理化的辩证法，特别是该观点的拥护者必须做什么才能为其提供令人信服的理由。