ABSTRACT

Theorists attending to the epistemic condition on responsibility are divided over whether moral ignorance is ever exculpatory. While those who argue that reasonable expectation is required for blameworthiness often maintain that moral ignorance can excuse, theorists who embrace a quality of will approach to blameworthiness are not sanguine about the prospect of excuses among morally ignorant wrongdoers. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that moral ignorance always reflects insufficient care for what matters morally, and therefore that moral ignorance never excuses. Furthermore, quality of will theorists treat their skepticism about excuses for the morally ignorant as a natural implication of their approach. It is therefore unsurprising that, while many have argued for the blamelessness of certain morally ignorant agents on grounds concerning reasonable expectation, the possibility that morally ignorant agents might be blameless even according to quality of will views has not been adequately addressed. I illustrate and explain how it is possible for morally ignorant agents to display sufficient care for the morally relevant features of their wrong behavior. Thus, even if quality of will views are correct, moral ignorance sometimes excuses.

摘要

关注责任认知条件的理论家在道德无知是否可以开脱的问题上存在分歧。虽然那些认为应受责备需要合理预期的人通常坚持认为道德无知可以原谅，但那些接受可受责备的意志品质的理论家对道德无知的不法行为者的借口前景并不乐观。事实上，有时有人争辩说，道德无知总是反映出对道德问题的关注不够，因此道德无知永远不会成为借口。此外，意志品质理论家将他们对道德无知的借口的怀疑视为他们方法的自然含义。因此也就不足为奇了，虽然许多人以合理预期为由为某些道德无知的代理人的无罪辩护，但道德无知的代理人即使根据意志观点的质量也可能无罪的可能性尚未得到充分解决。我说明并解释了道德无知的代理人如何对其错误行为的道德相关特征表现出足够的关注。因此，即使意志观点的质量是正确的，道德无知有时也会成为借口。