ABSTRACT

In this paper, I shall explore the relationship between the control required for action and the control required for moral responsibility. I shall argue that there is an incongruity between Frankfurt’s account of guidance control presented in his theory of action and his commitment to the claim that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. This inconsistency centres around the role of abilities to do otherwise in our analyses of action and moral responsibility. After outlining the problem for Frankfurt, I shall then motivate one way of resolving this tension. This solution provides a unified role for abilities to do otherwise in our analyses of control.

摘要

在本文中，我将探讨行动所需的控制与道德责任所需的控制之间的关系。我将争辩说，法兰克福在他的行动理论中提出的指导控制说明与他对道德责任不需要替代可能性的主张的承诺之间存在不一致。在我们对行动和道德责任的分析中，这种不一致集中在不作为的能力的作用上。在概述了法兰克福的问题之后，我将提出一种解决这种紧张局势的方法。该解决方案为在我们的控制分析中执行其他操作的能力提供了统一的角色。