ABSTRACT

Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, I explore whether the alternatives could be physically undifferentiated, despite their moral difference. The reason there is an ineliminable moral difference is because there is an ineliminable causal one: The agent’s choice must be caused by his own inclinations in one sequence, but by Black’s manipulation in the other. Whether this causal difference entails a physical one depends on whether we suppose causal relations conform to Humean supervenience. The denial of the latter requires us to either reject any broadly Humean view of causation, or else to suppose that we can individuate events or their qualities independently of the physical facts. If these are coherent possibilities, such examples may show that physically differentiated alternatives are not required for moral responsibility. This could support compatibilism, but only if such examples adequately parallel determinism, and I remain sceptical on this point.

摘要

法兰克福式反例中的代理人似乎只在他们自愿按照实际顺序行事的情况下负责，但需要违背他们的意愿被操纵以在替代顺序中形成相关意图。这种差异似乎无法消除，并且不可避免地具有道德意义。“新法兰克福人”承认这些序列必须在物理上有所区别，但否认它们在道德上的区别。相比之下，我探讨了替代方案是否可以在物理上没有区别，尽管它们在道德上存在差异。存在不可消除的道德差异的原因是因为存在不可消除的因果关系一：代理人的选择在一个序列中必须是由他自己的倾向引起的，但在另一个序列中是由布莱克的操纵引起的。这种因果差异是否包含物理差异取决于我们是否假设因果关系符合休谟附带性。否认后者要求我们要么拒绝任何广义的休谟式因果关系观点，要么假设我们可以独立于物理事实来个体化事件或其性质。如果这些是连贯的可能性，那么这些例子可能表明，道德责任不需要物理上不同的替代方案。这可以支持相容论，但前提是这些例子充分平行于决定论，我对这一点仍然持怀疑态度。