ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that having ‘leeway’ is part and parcel of what it is to be the agential source of an action, so that embracing source incompatibilism does not, by itself, absolve the incompatibilist of the need to find Frankfurtian agents to be possessors of alternate possibilities. I offer a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, based on the idea that Frankfurt's Jones exercises the two-way power of agency when he acts – a power whose exercise intrinsically implies the possibility of having done otherwise. I then show how to respond to the objection that the alternative possibility noted is not sufficiently ‘robust’ to ground his moral responsibility. I also distinguish my own argument for the claim that source incompatibilism is not truly independent of leeway incompatibilism from an argument for the same conclusion which has been offered previously by Kevin Timpe, and suggest that my own version has the dialectical advantage that it does not automatically assume from the outset that sourcehood requires indeterminism, and hence is in line with the traditional idea that the alternate possibilities requirement on moral responsibility is the common property of compatibilists and incompatibilists alike.

摘要

在本文中，我认为拥有“余地”是成为行动的代理源的重要组成部分，因此接受源不相容论本身并不能免除不相容论者寻找法兰克福代理的需要拥有其他可能性。我对交替可能性原则的法兰克福式反例做出回应，基于这样一种观点，即法兰克福的琼斯在采取行动时会行使双向代理权——这种权力的行使本质上意味着有可能以其他方式行事。然后，我将展示如何回应反对意见，即所指出的替代可能性不足以“稳健”以确立他的道德责任。我还将我自己关于源不相容论并非真正独立于余地不相容论的论点与凯文·蒂姆先前提供的同一结论的论点区分开来，并建议我自己的版本具有辩证优势，它不会自动从一开始就假设来源需要不确定性，