Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

中文翻译：

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团结一致：非博弈论与博弈论

组的每个成员都选择一个职位，并且对他所选择的职位有偏好。群体的和谐取决于满足特定条件的所选职位的概况。我们基于一组允许的个体位置分析解决方案概念（Richter 和 Rubinstein，2020），其作用类似于竞争均衡中的价格。给定允许的集合，成员选择他们最喜欢的位置。如果选择的位置不和谐，则设置收紧，如果没有必要限制，则放宽。这种新的均衡概念产生的结果比相应博弈中的纳什均衡更具吸引力。