This paper studies the role of publicly available accounting information in class conflict between capital and labour in Victorian Britain. The company investigated – the Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd – is one of the earliest industrial enterprises registered under the Companies Act 1862. The period studied is 1863, when the company was incorporated, through to 1900 by which time the workforce comprised approximately 6400 colliery and iron workers. The history of the company is contextualised in two ways. First, by positioning it within the coal and iron industry in terms of market share, size and profitability. Second, by locating Staveley’s labour management policies within relevant contemporary economic theory. It is then revealed, through an in-depth study of the company’s archives, that the directors sought to manage and manipulate the workforce through the provision of welfare facilities and by denying worker access to accounting information relevant for wage bargaining purposes. The study also unveils the directors’ report as an instrument deployed to project the image of a caring employer and to explain, to its shareholders, the sound business sense of committing resources for that purpose.

本文研究了公开可用的会计信息在维多利亚时代英国资本和劳动力之间的阶级冲突中的作用。被调查的公司——Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd——是最早根据 1862 年《公司法》注册的工业企业之一。所研究的时期是 1863 年，该公司成立时，一直到 1900 年，当时员工人数约为 6400 名煤矿和铁工。公司的历史以两种方式进行背景化。首先，根据市场份额、规模和盈利能力将其定位于煤炭和钢铁行业。其次，通过在相关的当代经济理论中定位斯塔夫利的劳动管理政策。然后通过对公司档案的深入研究发现，董事试图通过提供福利设施和拒绝工人获得与工资谈判目的相关的会计信息来管理和操纵劳动力。该研究还揭示了董事报告作为一种工具，用于展示一个有爱心的雇主的形象，并向其股东解释为此目的投入资源的良好商业意识。