We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex-ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.

中文翻译：

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工程危机：偏袒和战略性财政纪律

我们基于以下观点发展了一种关于财政危机内生出现的政治经济学理论：危机的调整机制有利于某些社会群体，这些群体可能会被事前诱导投票支持更有可能导致危机的财政政策. 如果受青睐的群体足够大，更大程度的偏袒会导致更高的公共债务和更频繁的危机，以及更高的公共支出。我们提供了条件，在这些条件下，受青睐的群体在战略上支持较弱的国家的财政能力，并且宪法对债务的限制提高了所有穷人的效用。